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GOVERNMENT TAKINGS
U.S. CONST. amend. V:
[Nior shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation.
N.Y. CONST. art. , § 7:
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
COURT OF APPEALS
Anello
V.
Zoning Board of Appeals of the Village of Dobbs Ferry'
(decided February 18, 1997)
Petitioner, Rose E. Anello, was denied a variance from the
Village of Dobbs Ferry Zoning Board of Appeals (hereinafter
"the Board"). 2 She was not permitted to build a single-family
dwelling on her property because it was located in an area
considered to be environmentally sensitive.3 The petitioner
maintained that the Board's denial of a variance rendered her
property unusable, depriving her of any property interest.4
Petitioner appealed, claiming that she should be compensated
on the ground that the ordinance, instructing the Board to deny
variances that may adversely effect the condition of the
environmentally sensitive area, worked a taking of her property.'
1 89 N.Y.2d 535, 678 N.E.2d 870, 656 N.Y.S.2d 184, cert. dismissed, 118
S. Ct. 2 (1997).
2 1d. at 539, 678 N.E.2d at 870-71, 656 N.Y.2d at 184-85.
3 Id. at 539, 678 N.E.2d at 870, 656 N.Y.2d at 184.41d.
5 Id. at 539, 678 N.E.2d at 871, 656 N.Y.2d at 185.
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The Takings Clause of the United States Constitution6 and the
New York Constitution7 mandate that the government may not
take property without paying the owner just compensation.'
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate
Division's ruling that the petitioner was not entitled to just
compensation. 9 The court concluded that petitioner was on notice
of the pre-existing ordinance when she had purchased the
property. 10  Therefore, the denial of the variance did not
constitute a taking of property for which the petitioner was
entitled to just compensation.11
The Village of Dobbs Ferry had enacted a "steep slope" zoning
ordinance concerning property on the sides of hills.' 2  "To
determine whether a lot was large enough to be developed, the
ordinance required a percentage reduction of the property's gross
area depending upon the degree of the property's slope, which
yielded the buildable area." 13 Consequently, the buildable size of
the lot was reduced according to the degree of the incline.14 The
petitioner applied for a variance from the "steep slope" ordinance
to build a single-family dwelling; however, the variance was
denied by the Board. 5 The Board reasoned that petitioner
"'acquired the property over two years after the "steep slope"
6 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part:
"nor shall private property be taken away for public use, without just
compensation." Id.
7 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7. Article I, section 7 provides in pertinent part:
"Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."
Id.
Sd.
9Anello, 89 N.Y.2d at 539, 678 N.E.2d 871, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
'Id. at 540, 678 N.E.2d at 871, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
Il Id.
12 Id. at 539, 678 N.E.2d at 870, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 184. The ordinance was
designed "to protect environmentally sensitive lands, preserve the Village's
natural resources and promote the orderly development of land . . . with
excessively steep slope areas." Id. (citing Dobbs Ferry Village Code § 30-35
D).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 id.
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law came into effect and therefore had full knowledge that the lot
was unbuildable and non-conforming." ,6 In addition, the Board
discovered that according a variance to construct a dwelling
might impose a significant hardship on the environmentally
sensitive area.17 Moreover, the ordinance reflected the exercise
of the villages' police powers"8 which relate to the safety and
public health of the neighborhood.' 9 Accordingly, the application
of the ordinance and the denial of the variance precluded all use
of the petitioner's lot."
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by addressing the
reasoning behind the holding of the Appellate Division.2' In
Khan v. Zoning Board of Appeals,2 respondent, Shahid U. Khan,
purchased property deemed to be partially located in a "flood
plain" area.2' According to the Village zoning ordinance, a
permit to build on the "flood plain" area could not be issued,
unless a variance was obtained from the Village Board of
Trustees.24 Thus, respondent sought the issuance of a variance.'
Shortly after his request, the ordinance was amended to include a
regulation "limiting development and restricting new construction
on environmentally sensitive areas," such as flood areas.2 Due
to the newly enacted regulation, the respondent was denied a
6 Id.
17 id.
" See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991). The Court
noted that "[t]he State traditional police power is defined as the authority to
provide for the public health, safety and morals and such a basis for legislation
has been upheld. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61
(1973).
'9 Anello, 89 N.Y.2d at 539, 678 N.E.2d at 870, 656 N.Y.S.2d 184.
2 id.
21 id.
22 87 N.Y.2d 344, 662 N.E.2d at 782, 639 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1996).
3Id. at 347, 662 N.E.2d at 783, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
24 d. at 347, 662 N.E.2d at 783-84, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 303-04.
25 id.
26Id. at 347-48, 662 N.E.2d at 784, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 304. The Village
Planning Board subtracted the "base site area" from the "resource protection
land" which equaled the "net buildable site area." Id. at 348, 662 N.E.2d at
784, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
1998 1069
3
et al.: Governmental Takings
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998
TOURO LAWREVIEW
variance, 27 and the respondent's property was, in essence,
rendered completely unbuildable.2 The Appellate Division, in
Khan, held that "since the respondent owned the subject property
in "single and separate ownership, 29 prior to the enactment of the
ordinance rendering it non-conforming, respondent had a vested
right to use the property for residential purposes." 30
The Khan court refused to adopt a rule protecting landowners
in "single and separate ownership" situations,31 stating that "a
municipality may in reasonable exercise of its police powers
change its zoning to control land use and development. 32 The
municipality may or may not include exemptions, within its
ordinance, to alleviate the effects these changes may cause
owners of property held in "single and separate ownership., 33 In
the absence of an exemption, a property owner may obtain relief
by engaging in the procedure of procuring a variance.34 The
court then concluded "since the owner's constitutional rights are
amply protected by the availability of such proceedings, there is
no legal basis for overriding the municipality's legislative choice.
"$35
In Kim v. City of New York,36 plaintiff, Soon Duck Kim,
purchased property ten years after the City of New York changed
the legal grade of the street abutting the property.37 Although the
legal grade had been changed, the physical grade had not been
changed. 3' Kim did not have actual notice of the map, indicating
27 Id. at 348-49, 662 N.E.2d at 784-85, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 304-05.
1 Id.
29 Id. at 34, 662 N.E.2d at 781, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 301. In Khan, the court
explained that the "single and separate ownership" exception protected
landowners of long-term property, which was conforming prior to the newly-
enacted amendment, from rendering the property unusable. Id.
30 Id. at 349. 662 N.E.2d at 784-85, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 304-05.
31 Id. at 350, 662 N.E.2d at 785, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 id.
36 90 N.Y.2d 1, 681 N.E.2d 312, 659 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1997).
37 Id. at 3-4, 681 N.E.2d 312, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
38 Id.
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the change, filed in the Borough President's office.39 However,
the filing of it constituted constructive notice of the legal grade at
the time he purchased the property. 4' Two years after his
purchase, the plaintiff was informed that the City was planning to
raise the street to the established legal grade.4
While the plaintiff had an obligation to maintain lateral support
to the legal grade of the street, he did not.42 Therefore, the City
itself placed the fill on the land.43 Plaintiff claimed that the City's
action in filling the street to the legal grade constituted a taking of
his property; therefore, compensation should be afforded. 4 The
New York Court of Appeals held that plaintiff was not entitled to
just compensation, reasoning that plaintiff acquired the title to the
property subject to the pre-existing obligation to maintain lateral
support to the legal grade of the street.45
Similarly, in Gazza v. New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation," petitioner, Joseph F. Gazza,
purchased land that had been partly designated wetlands.47 The
area was zoned residential; however, due to certain wetland
regulations, a variance had to be obtained in order to construct a
single-family home.48 Petitioner was denied a variance because
of the adverse affect the construction of a residence would have
on the wetlands contained on the property.49 Upon denial of the
variance, the petitioner claimed this was a taking of his property
interest."0 The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner was
unable to establish a taking because "he never owned an absolute
right to build on his land without a variance." 5" The court further
39 Id.
401id.
41 id.
4' Id.
42id
43 Id. at 14, 681 N.E.2d 319, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
4Id. at 4-5, 681 N.E.2d at 313-14, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 146-47.
45 Id. at 5, 681 N.E.2d at 314, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
89 N.Y.2d 603, 679 N.E.2d 1035, 657 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1997).
47 Id. at 608, 679 N.E.2d at 1036, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 556.48Id.
49 Id. at 609, 679 N.E.2d at 1037, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
50 1d. at 611, 679 N.E.2d at 1038, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
51 Id. at 615, 679 N.E.2d at 1040, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
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stated that "since the enactment of the wetland regulations, the
only permissible uses for the subject property were dependent
upon the regulations which were a legitimate exercise of police
power." '52 In addition, "[p]etitioner cannot base a taking claim
upon an interest he never owned. The property interests owned
by the petitioner are defined by those state laws enacted and in
effect at the time he took title . . . .
In response to the petitioner's contention, that the denial of a
variance by the Board worked a taking of her property, the court
determined that a regulatory taking had not occurred. The Anello
court noted that the petitioner "never acquired an unfettered right
to build on the property free from the "steep slope" ordinance."
54
Furthermore, the "steep slope" ordinance had been in effect for
two years prior to the petitioners' purchase of the property.
Thus, "this statutory restriction encumbered petitioner's title
from the outset of the ownership and its enforcement does not
constitute a governmental taking of property.""
In Anello, Kim, and Gazza, the Court of Appeals held that
neither restrictive regulations nor physical invasion resulted in a
taking when the owners bought their land after the regulations
were enacted. Furthermore, the Anello court observed that the
petitioner never challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance.
Instead, she asserted that the ordinance worked a taking as
applied to her property.56 The Anello court concluded that the
rule articulated in all three opinions would enhance certainty. 57 It
would cause purchasers of land burdened with restrictions to
52 Id.
s Id. at 615-16, 679 N.E.2d at 1040, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
Anello v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Village of Dobbs Ferry, 89
N.Y.2d 535, 539-40,678 N.E.2d 870, 871, 656 N.Y.S.2d 184, 185 (1997).
55 Id. at 540, 678 N.E.2d at 871, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 185. See also Basile V.
Town of Southhampton, 89 N.Y.2d 974, 678 N.E.2d 489, 655 N.Y.S.2d 877
(1997). In Basile, the property was zoned residential, however, regulations
permitted no use of the property, except as a wetland. Id. at 975-76, 678
N.E.2d at 490-91, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 878-79. The Court of Appeals held this
was not a "taking" reasoning that the petitioner bought the property with the
wetland regulation in place and had notice. Id.
16 Anello, 89 N.Y.2d at 540, 678 N.E.2d at 871, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
5 Id.
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challenge the constitutionality of the pre-existing law rather than
asserting a taking of an individual property interest, facilitating
the transferability of title. 8
In Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon,59 the court held
that the "purchase of property with knowledge of the restriction
does not bar the purchaser from testing the validity of the zoning
ordinance .. . .", The Vernon Park Reality case emphasized an
important point.6 1 The petitioner in Anello could have challenged
the Village of Dobbs Ferry zoning ordinance, in addition to
challenging the denial of the variance.Y
The Court of Appeals recognized that the takings issue present
in the Anello case did not apply under a Federal Constitutional
analysis.6 In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City,6 the Supreme Court articulated the traditional takings
analysis, "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectation."' Similarly, in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal CounciP6 the Court held that when the
58 Id.
59 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954).60 Id. at 500, 121 N.E.2d at 520.
61 Id.
6 Id.
6 Id.
6 Penn Central Transportation v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
In Penn Central, an historic preservation ordinance prohibited building over
Grand Central Station. 438 U.S. at 115-16. The Supreme Court stated that
the ordinance as applied to Penn Central did not constitute a " taking," since
Penn Central not only profited but also earned a "reasonable return" on
investment. Id. at 136.
1 Id. at 127 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1992)).
In Mahon, a statute was enacted by the Pennsylvania legislature prohibiting the
removal of coal if removing it would cause subsidence damage to buildings on
the surface. Id. at 395. Defendant coal company owned the rights to mine the
coal underneath the surface. Id at 412. The Court stated that an exercise of
the police power results in a compensable taking if it goes to far. Id. at 415.
The Court found that the statute went to far; resulting in a taking of the coal
company's property. Id. at 414-16.
66 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). In Lucas, plaintiff purchased two beachfront
properties intending to build upon them. Id. at 1006-07. Before he began
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government deprives the owner of all economically beneficial use
of the property it automatically constitutes a "taking." '67 In both
Penn Central and Lucas, the issue before the Court was the
impact of the newly enacted legislation. 8
In Anello, the issue before the court was not the "impact of
newly enacted regulations on a property owner's investment-
backed expectations." 69  Rather, the issue was whether a pre-
existing regulation applied to subsequent purchasers who claimed
that the pre-existing ordinance worked a taking of their property.
In relation to the Federal law, "if property owners were
permitted to assert compensatory takings claims based on
enforcement of pre-existing regulations, the traditional takings
analysis would be rendered hopelessly circular." 70
In concluding that the pre-existing regulation does not work a
taking, the court recognized that if the prior owner does not
assert a takings claim it is possible that the selling price of his
property would be far less because of the restrictions imposed."
Furthermore, if the subsequent purchaser is compensated because
it is found that the restriction worked a taking then "any
compensation received by the subsequent owner for enforcement
of the very restriction that served to abate the purchase price
would amount to a windfall ... .
construction, the legislature enacted a statute that prohibited development of
the land. Id.
67 Id. at 1027.
MId. at 1019; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
69 Anello v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Village of Dobbs Ferry, 89
N.Y.2d 535, 541 n.1, 678 N.E.2d 870, 871 n.1, 656 N.Y.S.2d 184, 185 n.1
(1997).
70 Id. at 540-41, 678 N.E.2d at 871, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
71 Id.
2 Id.
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